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Abstract: In which sense can literature be conceived as an experiment? What
type of experiment and experience does literature offer and what type or dimension
of reality is at stake in literary investigations? What are the ontological stakes of
literature in its construction of another world or a second nature? In this essay, I
address these questions in discussion with two authors who explicitly understand
literature as experiment, namely Paul Ricoeur and Giorgio Agamben. To get a
better sense of these ontological stakes of the experiment of literature, I will first
turn to Ricoeur’s account. Subsequently, I will offer a critical discussion of how his
concept of configuration, a central notion in his theory of narrative, actually limits
the sense of the literary experiment and its ontological stakes. This discussion
will address the relation between the concepts of potentiality, contingency, and
event. Finally, I will turn to Agamben’s reading of Herman Melville’s famous story
Bartleby, the Scrivener to offer a different sense of both the ontological stakes of
the literary experiment and the relation between these three concepts.
I. LITERATURE CONDUCTING EXPERIMENTS
In §49 of Critique of Judgment, Kant famously writes: ‘The imagination (as
a productive power of cognition) is very powerful in creating, as it were, an
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other nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature.’1 For the
imagination, nature and the experiences it affords are the raw material to be
brought into a new form or second nature; and in this sense, the imagination
‘surpasses nature’. Applied to literature, Dichtkunst, which Kant assigns the
highest rank among the fine arts, this creative power is described in the
following terms:
It invigorates the mind by letting it feel its faculty – free, sponta-
neous, and independent of determination by nature – of regarding
and judging nature as phenomenon in the light of aspects which
nature of itself does not afford us in experience, either for the
senses or the understanding, and of employing it accordingly on
behalf of, and as a sort of schema for, the supersensible.2
By the creation of a new world or nature, the literary imagination thus
offers new, lively ways of experiencing the world, ways that nature itself
cannot provide. In this sense, literature can be considered as a space in
which the human mind conducts experiments that create other worlds in
order to experience the world in new ways and at other levels than nature
itself provides.
The idea that literature offers us fundamentally new perspectives – An-
sichten – of the world and of ourselves, is not foreign to present-day reflections
on the nature of literature. Yet, it does raise the question of what type of
experiment and experience literature provides and what type or dimension
of reality is at stake in such literary investigations. What is the ontological
commitment of literature in its construction of another world or a second
nature? In this essay, I want to address this question by, first, discussing
how Paul Ricoeur understands the image that literature is a space in which
experiments are conducted and, second, providing a critique of parts of this
understanding, inspired by the work of Giorgio Agamben.
Both Agamben and Ricoeur use the image of literature as a space of
experiments, and they do so out of a similar concern. Agamben introduces
this image when distinguishing the type of experiments conducted in the
natural sciences from those in literature:
These [literary] experiments do not simply concern the truth or
falsity of hypotheses, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some-
thing, as in scientific experiments; rather, they call into question
Being itself, before or beyond its determination as true or false.
These experiments are without truth, for truth is what is at issue
in them.3
Scientific experiments aim to establish the truth of a theory or the exis-
tence of some entity, but to this end, the senses of truth and existence based
on which experiments take place are already established and presupposed.
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For the literary experiment, however, truth and existence themselves are at
stake, exactly because – to phrase it in Kant’s vocabulary – literature creates
fundamentally new forms of experience of existence that do not depend on
the experiences offered by nature.
In a different context, also Ricoeur suggests that literature is a space of
experiments. At several occasions, he uses the metaphor of the laboratory:
‘What is more, new genres have appeared, in particular the novel, that have
turned literature into an immense laboratory for experiments in which, sooner
or later, every received convention has been set aside.’4 The transformation
of conventions does not only concern the literary form, but also its content
and its impact:
The practice of narrative lies in a thought experiment by means of
which we try to inhabit worlds foreign to us. . . . But we added that
reading also includes a moment of impetus. This is when read-
ing becomes a provocation to be and to act differently. However
this impetus is transformed into action only through a decision
whereby a person says: Here I stand!5
In literary experiments, truth and existence are not presupposed givens.
Rather, one’s mode of being and one’s actions are at stake when ‘reading
becomes a provocation to be and act differently’.6
Remarkably enough, in his continuation of the quote distinguishing sci-
entific from literary experiments, Agamben reaches a similar conclusion to
capture what it means that truth and existence are at stake in literature:
Whoever submits himself to these experiments jeopardises not so
much the truth of his own statements as the very mode of his
existence; he undergoes an anthropological change that is just as
decisive in the context of the individual’s natural history as the
liberation of the hand by the erect position was for the primate or
as was, for the reptile, the transformation of limbs that changed
it into a bird.7
Not the truth of this or that statement, but the human’s ‘very mode of
existence’ is at stake when someone is exposed to literary experiments since
they may lead to a genuine metamorphosis of one’s mode of being and one’s
mode of life.
Agamben uses the verb ‘to jeopardise’ to characterise the transforma-
tion to which the reader is exposed in these experiments. Similarly, Ricoeur
describes the relation between the reader and the text in terms of ‘being ex-
posed’: rather than merely imposing their prejudices on a text, readers are
exposed to the world of the text and its provocation to be and act differ-
ently.8 Hence, Agamben and Ricoeur point to the same peril at the heart of
the literary experiment affecting our mode of life and our mode of being.9 To
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get a better sense of the ontological commitment of literary experiments – a
commitment that concerns in the first place one’s mode of being but subse-
quently affects also one’s mode of life – I will first turn to Ricoeur’s account
of them. Subsequently, I will offer a critical discussion of how his concept of
configuration, a central notion in his theory of narrative, actually tends to
impose undesirable limitations on the literary experiment and its ontological
commitment. This will be shown especially in relation to the notions of po-
tentiality, contingency, and event. Finally, I will turn to Agamben’s reading
of Herman Melville’s famous story Bartleby, the Scrivener to offer a different
sense of both the ontological stakes of the literary experiment and the relation
between these three concepts.
II. THE INVARIANT OF IMAGINARY VARIATIONS
The impact of Kant’s account of the productive imagination on the hermeneu-
tic tradition can hardly be overstated. To understand how Ricoeur uses this
human faculty in his theory of literature, let me first recall how for Dilthey,
the imagination’s capacity to vary freely on our own experiences, Erlebnisse,
is a condition of possibility to understand retrospectively, Verstehen, and to
re-experience forwardly, Nacherleben, the psychic life of others:10
Every lively presentification of a milieu and external situation
stimulates a re-experiencing in us, and the imagination can in-
crease or diminish the intensity of the attitudes, powers, feelings,
strivings, and thought-tendencies that characterise our own life-
nexus in order to re-create the psychic life of any other person.
. . . Thus human beings who are determined from within can expe-
rience many other kinds of existence through the imagination.11
This quote concerns the possibility of understanding other people. Yet, the
characteristic task and operation of the imagination disclosed here extends
beyond the realm of intersubjective understanding. In fact, Dilthey offers
here a predecessor of what Ricoeur will call distanciation. Each psychic life is
‘determined from within’, according to Dilthey: the particularities of our own
course of life determine the specific life-nexus of this psychic life. Nevertheless,
thanks to the faculty of the imagination, our sense of life and our experiences
are not limited to historical determination of one’s own existence. One’s
lived experiences are the point of departure for the imagination to create
other experiences that allow us to ‘experience many other kinds of existence’.
Hence, the imagination extends the realm of experiences beyond the confines
of what we can experience immediately. For my analysis in the third section, it
is important to emphasise that this work of the imagination does not only offer
the possibility of a retrospective understanding, but also that of a forward
re-experiencing of other psychic lives, as if we are in the same flux of life that
marks the experience.
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Although Ricoeur criticises the central role awarded to the psychic life
in Dilthey’s hermeneutics, there are nevertheless structural similarities with
his own description of the literary imagination and the type of referential
value awarded to the products of the imagination. For Ricoeur, the point of
departure is not the determination by one’s own immediate experiences, but
rather the basic familiarity with our everyday world. This basic familiarity
and the attitude to the world with which it comes equipped are mirrored
in language: everyday language refers ostensibly to objects in our everyday
world; everyday language entertains a descriptive relation to reality. Yet,
although this being-rooted-in a particular everyday situation is everyone’s
basic point of departure for understanding the world, human understanding
is not limited to it. Humans have the capacity to understand reality also at
another level.
Within the phenomenological tradition, to which Ricoeur belongs, this
‘other level’ is known as being-in-the-world, a term introduced by Heidegger
in Being and Time.12 While in their everyday dealings with the world, hu-
man beings understand the world in terms of the innerworldly beings they
encounter and which they can describe in the conceptual and pragmatic lan-
guage they have at their disposal, the human understanding has a higher
potential, namely to understand the human being’s very mode of existence,
which is being-in-the-world. At this level, for Ricoeur, language is no longer
mainly descriptive – since it is no longer focused on describing beings humans
find in the world – but language adopts another form that enables the human
being to express the temporal constitution of human existence. Although
inspired by Heidegger, by emphasising this latter role of language, Ricoeur
departs from the Heideggerian enterprise in Being and Time: rather than
following Heidegger’s attempt to immediately access or disclose this mode of
being, Ricoeur rethinks Heidegger’s proposal in a Kantian-Diltheyan way. He
awards an essential role to the mediating work of the imagination to offer an
understanding of reality at the level of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world. It is
the poetic imagination that invents the (partial) disclosure of this reality.
Yet, one could immediately object: why do we need this addition to Hei-
degger? If there is an immediate way of understanding being-in-the-world,
why would one take the detour of symbols, metaphors and literature, however
aesthetically pleasing they may be? For Ricoeur, however, no immediate way
of disclosing the objectives of Heidegger’s phenomenology exists.13 This is a
basic gesture inspiring his hermeneutical work, starting with his reflections on
the indispensability of symbols in the 1960s. Of certain phenomena such as
that of evil, he claims, we cannot have a direct experience or understanding.14
Our understanding of them is necessarily mediated by symbols that announce
and disclose these phenomena to us. It is important to see the basic Kantian
heritage at this point: the work of the imagination consists in offering new
perspectives and new experiences that our everyday existence cannot offer
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by itself. Hence, the imagination’s linguistic creations constitute modes of
experiencing phenomena that are not given in everyday experience, but that
nevertheless concern our reality. These phenomena are only offered in the
form of their presentation by the imagination.
In line with Kant’s conception of the aesthetic idea, Ricoeur will argue
that this presentation is itself not conceptual or of the order of understanding,
but is rather a provocation and a demand to think. The imagination, as he
writes in a comment on Kant’s aesthetic idea, presents an Idea ‘to which
no concept is equal’, and which therefore ‘forces conceptual thought to think
more’; he adds: ‘Creative imagination is nothing other than this demand
put to conceptual thought.’15 Hence, when we say that it is by the literary
presentation alone that certain phenomena are given to the understanding,
we mean to say that the understanding is provoked to think and interpret
them, but at the same time is incapable of fully appropriating them.
The question of how the products of the imagination offer us a mediated
(and partial) understanding of the basic level of human existence and of the
world, is a fundamental question for Ricoeur’s oeuvre as a whole and can be
addressed in different directions.16 For the particular purposes of my argu-
ment, I will only focus on the specific ontological dimension related to his
turn to the literary text and which can be accounted for in terms of distan-
ciation.17 According to Dilthey, the imagination suspends the determining
nature of the immediate experiences that constitute the psychic life in order
to open up our understanding to all kinds of other existences. Analogously,
Ricoeur’s literary imagination is the productive suspension or distanciation
of the everyday world – ‘the abolition of a first-order reference, an abolition
effected by fiction and poetry’,18 as he writes – that allows for the production
of another type of reference, namely that of the human being’s mode of being.
Yet, it reaches this dimension of reality only in a mimetic form, in the form
of an aesthetic idea that presents it as an image without offering an adequate
concept for it. Ricoeur therefore writes that the literary text discloses a world
of its own, a purely imaginative world, which nevertheless is an imaginative
world I could inhabit. Since I could inhabit it, this imaginative world does
present us with an image of what it means to be in a world. The task of
interpretation is subsequently located at the threshold of literature and the
conceptual determination of what the aesthetic idea demands us to think.
This turning of phenomenology’s attention from what appears or is imme-
diately given to us towards literature’s disclosure of a possible world shows
the difference in object that phenomenology and poetics aim at: ‘Fiction
and poetry intend being, not under the modality of being-given, but under
the modality of power-to-be [pouvoir-être].’19 In this quote, pouvoir-être is
translated as ‘power-to-be’. Yet, I want to emphasise that pouvoir-être is
Ricoeur’s translation of Heidegger’s Seinkönnen, potentiality-of-being. This
demonstrates once more the importance of Heidegger as Ricoeur’s partner in
conversation since the human understanding of one’s authentic potentiality-
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of-being forms, for Heidegger, the very heart of his conception of the human
capacity to understand their own mode of being beyond the everyday focus
on innerworldly beings. For Ricoeur, the actual, everyday world is suspended
by the imagination in order to be potentialised in the world of the text. This
potentialisation by fiction implies that the connection with actual reality has
not simply been severed. Rather, Ricoeur offers once more a Kantian reinter-
pretation of Heidegger’s Seinkönnen. Kant speaks of the quickening effect of
the imagination, which for him is in the first place a feeling.20 In The Rule of
Metaphor, Ricoeur still uses the same image of life and the enlivening effect
to account for the particular hermeneutic experience at stake in the seman-
tic innovation of metaphor. Yet, in his account of literature and narrative,
he opts for a more ontological terminology in order to emphasise that the
question of literature does not so much concern the psychic life of subjects
and their feelings, but rather concerns the imaginative world displayed by
the text. Therefore, instead of the enlivening effect of literature, Ricoeur
speaks of its potentialisation: the literary imagination presents the world in
its potentiality, invented by the imagination.
This brings us to the essence of literature as experiment. Analogous to
Dilthey’s suggestion that the imagination offers variations of the experiences
of our psychic life, Ricoeur notes that the different possible worlds presented
by the imagination are variations of our being-in-the-world.21 He adds that
these variations should be understood as imaginative variations in Husserl’s
sense. This means that literature ‘generates an open, endless manifold of
variations’ that aims at discovering an invariant that is shared by all these
variations.22 For Ricoeur, the particular invariant disclosed by these variations
is nothing less than the potentiality-of-being of human existence. In this
sense, literature conducts experiments that contribute to an understanding
and experience of this invariant. By the presentation of this potentiality-of-
being, our understanding of the world we inhabit and of the selves we are,
will be transformed, as Ricoeur immediately adds to the previous sentence:
‘Everyday reality is thereby metamorphosed by what could be called the
imaginative variations that literature carries out on the real.’23 Apparently,
the possibilities of existence and experience invented by literature provoke
and demand to think human existence in terms of this potentiality-of-being or
power-to-be. This invariant – and at this point Ricoeur deviates from a strict
Husserlian usage of the notion of imaginative variation – can never be fully
appropriated by the understanding; there is no Wesensschau possible, nor an
authentic appropriation à la Heidegger; the understanding rather depends on
the literary imagination to sense this invariant’s demand to be thought.
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III. CONTINGENCY AND THE CONFINES OF
CONFIGURATION
We’ve established in which sense Ricoeur emphasises the ontological and cog-
nitive importance of products of the imagination and literature. Yet, there
are elements in his theory of narrativity and the literary text that tend to
impose boundaries on what or how literature can actually present this in-
variant. In this section, by concentrating on some aspects of his theory of
configuration, I want to argue that the boundaries imposed by the notion of
configuration are in some respects counterproductive and in a specific sense
at odds with his determination of the specific ontological stakes of literature.
At this point, I do not want to describe in any detail his threefold ac-
count of mimesis as developed in Time and Narrative, but simply summarise
it as follows. Despite his interest in the idea of a plot, which ties together
characters, actions, situations, events, and so on, in an understandable unity,
thus creating what he calls a discordant concordance, Ricoeur is well aware
that our everyday world and our lives and actions do not let themselves be
understood in terms of such a plot. Nevertheless, our everyday world does
harbor different structures that prefigure or anticipate such a unity, albeit in
a fragmented way. Therefore, the suspension of our everyday world is nec-
essary to offer the imagination the possibility for emplotment, for gathering
together the different elements in the unity of a story that can be followed.
Hence, this unity does not belong to our experience of the world we inhabit,
but is rather the supplement and the genuine product of the act of configura-
tion. Nevertheless, despite this imaginative unity by which the story presents
a totality that enables our understanding of what happens in the story, this
literary distanciation does not make a return to the world we inhabit impos-
sible. In addition to prefiguration and configuration, Ricoeur distinguishes a
third element of literary mimesis, namely refiguration, which describes how
the configurations of the literary imagination can be applied to the world we
inhabit and to our self-understanding. Literature provides different figures
with which to understand our power-to-be and our power-to-act.
Thus, the idea of the unity of a plot clearly meets certain cognitive needs:
confronted with the fragmented reality of everyday life, the configuration of a
story offers a unity of the time of action, allowing us to understand this time.
Yet, it remains to be seen whether this rather strict need for unity does not
weaken the ontological stakes of the literary imagination.
In order to clarify where my concern comes from, let me return to Dilthey’s
distinction between a retrospective understanding and a forwardly oriented re-
experiencing. The understanding indeed presupposes a life-nexus, as Ricoeur
notes in reference to Dilthey.24 Yet, for Dilthey, the goal of the imagination is
not exhausted by this attempt to understand retroactively. Rather, it seems
to find its true fulfilment in the new experience it offers, in Dilthey’s Nacher-
leben, which is a forwardly oriented experiencing. This idea of a forwardly
oriented experience indicates that the experience of something meaningful
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does not presuppose an already completed unity. This raises the question
of whether Ricoeur’s insistence on a plot for the literary imagination does
not privilege the retrospective understanding and whether it does not rob us
from a forwardly oriented experience. In fact, confronted with the difference
between understanding and re-experiencing, one should ask the question of
whether refiguration cannot adopt these two different senses: is refiguration
limited to the attempt, for instance, to understand one’s own being and ac-
tion in light of the unity proposed by certain stories, or can it also concern the
reader’s lively experiences of their own being and acting?25 The latter form
of refiguration does not demand the same strict sense of unity in the concept
of emplotment as the former does. To add another question to clarify the
impact of the Diltheyan difference: What if a literary experiment does not
offer a clear plot or a clear unity of action or of character, but rather seems
to be concerned with presenting a disfiguration, that is, with a resistance to
offer a clear figure or form in the unity of its narration?26 While such an
experiment might not offer the possibility of a refiguration in the sense of
understanding one’s existence in light of the (temporal) figure offered by the
narrative, there seems to be no reason to assume that it could not offer the
possibility of re-experiencing in Dilthey’s sense.
The above remarks and questions concern the form of the literary image,
but the Diltheyan distinction also affects the content, that is, the particu-
lar ontological commitment of the literary experiment. Recall that Ricoeur
borrows a Heideggerian term to describe these stakes, namely potentiality-of-
being. Heidegger discovers this potentiality-of-being especially in his account
of the phenomenon of death as the ultimate possibility of Dasein’s existence.27
Since one cannot experience one’s own death in actuality, one can only relate
to one’s own death as possibility and, more precisely, as imminent possibility:
I can die at any moment. Consequently, from a Heideggerian perspective the
nexus (Ganzheit) of Dasein’s existence cannot be understood in terms of a
unity offered by a configuration: the ‘end’ of this totality, death, cannot be
understood retrospectively since a retrospective understanding would depict
one’s own death as past, as actualised; and this deprives the phenomenon of
one’s own death of its basic determination: death is only given to us as future,
imminent possibility.28 In fact, in Heidegger’s case, Dilthey’s forward-oriented
re-experiencing is replaced by a forward-oriented understanding. Death is the
phenomenon of the end of Dasein’s existence, but only as an end that is immi-
nent and that is to come. Moreover, to relate to one’s own death as possibility
is to understand or experience one’s own existence as one that can also not
be (or that can be otherwise). Although Heidegger would probably deem the
term ‘contingency’ to be too metaphysical, the description in the previous sen-
tence brings to mind exactly this notion: the experience of the contingency of
one’s own existence forms the heart of his account of potententiality-of-being.
Death is a figure of the contingency of Dasein’s existence, which can only be
understood as imminent and can, therefore, never be considered retrospec-
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tively. This Heideggerian interpretation of potentiality-of-being is, hence,
at odds with Ricoeur’s retrospective oriented understanding that favors the
unity of a configuration. Two examples from Oneself as Another allow me to
demonstrate the implications of this difference in more detail.
First, consider the following quote on the (non-)relation of contingency,
event and configuration:
The paradox of emplotment is that it inverts the effect of contin-
gency, in the sense of that which could have happened differently
or which might not have happened at all, by incorporating it in
some way into the effect of necessity or probability exerted by the
configuring act. The inversion of the effect of contingency into an
effect of necessity is produced at the very core of the event [. . . ].
The necessity is a narrative necessity whose meaning effect comes
from the configurating act as such [. . . ].29
This quote states that the act of configuration expels the experience of
contingency from a story. Although Ricoeur acknowledges that an event in
the strong sense of the word threatens the unity of a plot, he also argues
that an event is only an event in a story if it contributes to the unity of the
plot. Yet, an event contributes in this way only if the story offers a retro-
grade understanding of it and ‘transmutes’ the very contingency of the event
‘into fate’.30 In fact, for Ricoeur, the retroactive organisation should expel
contingency because this contingency of reality constitutes its very ‘elusive
character’.31 Ricoeur thus employs a distinction: the lived experience of con-
tingency confuses, whereas the retroactive organisation of the configurative
act offers figures for understanding. However, if the literary experiment is
concerned with this contingency, how can the emphasis on retroactive under-
standing offer an experience of contingency? How can it provoke and demand
thought to think it? Might there not be the possibility of a forward-oriented
understanding and can literature not also present the strange phenomenon
that Heidegger aims to think, namely the imminent event of Dasein’s death,
which cannot become part of a retroactively understood totality of life? In
a recent interview on his latest novel 4321, Paul Auster tells the story of the
lightning bold he witnessed when he was fourteen years old. While walking
in the forests, a storm broke and the novelist describes: ‘I was standing just
behind a boy who climbed under a fence when all of a sudden the lightning
struck him. [. . . ] Then I realised: everything can happen, at any time, to
anyone.’32 The event that is at stake here – and which returns in 4321 – is
not the event that has been transformed into the character’s fate by being
included in the plot of a story, but rather concerns the experience of the very
contingency of existence.
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Second, Heidegger’s attention to an authentic potentiality-of-being also
implies that Dasein is and understands itself as a nullity, which in the first
place means that there is no whatness or essence to Dasein’s being except
for this potentiality-of-being.33 Interestingly enough, Ricoeur’s discussion on
the relation between idem and ipse-identity in human selfhood in Oneself as
Another seems to find its limits exactly in the literary portrayal of human
selfhood in terms of such a nullity. Again, he encounters these limits due to
his adherence to the notion of configuration. Let me explain this.
Ricoeur suggests that literature offers experiments with this dialectical
relation between idem and ipse.34 He adds that certain forms of literature
tend to portray human narrative identity in such a way that it lacks the
support of the idem-identity, that is, of whatness. The example he refers
to in this context is Musil’s famous The Man Without Qualities. Indeed,
when literature creates forms of narration that truly allow humans without
qualities or properties to appear in the story, human selfhood is presented
in its ‘nullity’.35 If we understand literature as the imaginative variation of
this potentiality-of-being, Musil’s novel is a perfect example of one of these
variations because this potentiality can be presented as the absence of what-
ness. Yet, rather than understanding Musil’s novel as indeed such a crucial
example, Ricoeur mainly worries that these examples reach the limits of his
theory of emplotment:
To see more clearly the philosophical issues in this eclipse of the
identity of the character, it is important to note that, as the nar-
rative approaches the point of annihilation of the character, the
novel also loses its own properly narrative qualities [. . . ]. To the
loss of the identity of the character thus corresponds the loss of
the configuration of the narrative and, in particular, a crisis of the
closure of the narrative.36
These stories are marked by a ‘crisis of the closure of the narrative’. Yet,
this crisis is basically due to the fact that the narrative does not complete
its retrospective organisation. This is the crisis of a narrated event whose
transformation into a mere part of the retroactively understood fate of this
character is not concluded. Yet, why to understand this as a problem? Rather
than failing to close, should we not say that this narrative form disfigures the
narrative model of configuration so that another experience of the event and
of the nexus of a life is presented: not a retroactive one, but one with a
forward orientation? If this is the case, it simply offers a fully-fledged literary
experiment with human selfhood.
Ricoeur himself is fully aware of this strange conflict between the ontolog-
ical impact of literature and the theoretical confines of configuration imposed
on the literary imagination by his account of narrative. In fact, towards the
end of the sixth study of Oneself as Another, Ricoeur acknowledges the impor-
tance of the disfiguration at work in stories such as Musil’s: ‘The self refigured
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here by the narrative is in reality confronted with the hypothesis of its own
nothingness.’37 The refiguration, that is, the application of the presentation
of the self by a novel such as Musil’s to one’s self, is in fact a disfiguration:
its effect is that the self is robbed from all figures by which the self seeks to
identify itself. Yet, as Ricoeur notes in the same quote, this nothingness is
not simply nothing. Rather, this nothingness of whatness or essence is the
reverse of the basic potentiality-of-being that literature proposes.38
Exactly at these points, without properly acknowledging it, Ricoeur seems
to step beyond the confines of his own account of emplotment. After all, es-
pecially narratives such as Musil’s disclose the potentiality-of-being in all its
‘nakedness’ by robbing the self of all senses of sameness, essence and whatness.
Moreover, the literary imagination’s presentation of the human’s potentiality-
of-being is not only a portrayal of the self as the one who can try anything.
Rather, this literary disclosure comes equipped with a specific call, a provo-
cation or demand: to read literature is not only to enjoy the different worlds
one could inhabit and to contemplate the different possibilities of being and
acting that are opened up in this way, but ‘reading also includes a moment of
impetus’, as Ricoeur adds, and he explains: ‘This is when reading becomes a
provocation to be and to act differently. However this impetus is transformed
into action only through a decision whereby a person says: Here I stand!’39
To hear in the presentation or disclosure of human potentiality-of-being a call
to be and to act differently, is to hear the demand for a decision to adopt
a certain mode of existence. Such a decision is reflected in a commitment
– ‘Here I stand’, as Ricoeur repeats after Levinas – which is not without
relation to the resoluteness – Entschlossenheit – Heidegger introduces to de-
scribe how Dasein is involved in and committed to the disclosure of its own
potentiality-of-being.40 Ricoeur himself notes that this call for commitment
is most pressing in those stories ‘which go so far as to paralyse the capacity
for firm action’, because they present the self as detached from and not sup-
ported by any form of ‘whatness’ or permanence in the self itself.41 Yet, why
grant such a crucial role to these stories when they seem to escape from the
normal model of literary configuration?
IV. THE LITERARY EXPERIMENT AND THE
POTENTIALITY NOT TO . . .
I’ve noted in the introduction that Agamben and Ricoeur seem to have sim-
ilar conceptions of literature as experiment. In section 2, I analysed how
for Ricoeur the notion of potentiality-of-being describes what is at stake in
the literary experiment. In section 3, I showed how this leaves us with the
question of contingency as one of the possible interpretations of this sense of
potentiality that Ricoeur cannot properly integrate into his account of the
literary experiment because of the confines the notion of configuration im-
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poses on his conception of literature. I will now turn to Agamben because for
him the literary experiment conducted in Bartleby, the Scrivener concerns
exactly potentiality and contingency, that is, they are the very object of this
literary experiment.42
In terms of the concluding remarks of the previous section, the choice for
Bartleby, the Scrivener is felicitous because of the character of Bartleby, who
changes in the course of the story from a highly industrious clerk – someone
whose existence, like the clerk depicted in Gogol’s The Overcoat before his
encounter with the overcoat, is truly identical to being a clerk and whose very
essence or whatness is being-a-clerk – into someone who refuses everything
in the reality in which he exists. Hence, his story exemplifies stories ‘which
go so far as to paralyse the capacity for firm action’. While for Ricoeur this
seems to be a problem that can only be overcome by firmly taking a stand,
Agamben’s analysis of this figure’s incapacity to act goes into a fundamentally
different direction.
For Agamben, Bartleby’s transformation exemplifies that the heart of the
human capacity to act is not to be found in the actualisation of this capacity.
Rather, this capacity concerns the human potential not to act. Bartleby
transforms into this potential not to act. In this sense, even though the
story has a clear configuration in a formal sense, this configuration does not
offer us a clear portrayal of the actions or the inner development of the main
character. Rather, in the story, Bartleby seems to be the locus where the
character disappears and his name becomes the cipher of absence – absence
of action, absence of inner considerations or thoughts, and so on. In this sense,
the possibility of refiguration becomes impossible if refiguration is supposed
to portray the multitude of different actions one can undertake in different
circumstances: Bartleby becomes an empty place in the world depicted by
the narrator of the story, as if Bartleby simply refuses to participate in this
world and refuses to adopt the role awarded to him – first in the office and
subsequently in the world. Yet, as Agamben insists, Bartleby does not become
nothing. Rather, for Agamben, Bartleby becomes the cipher of potentiality
itself. In the world of the text, he becomes the one who presents human
potentiality since not to act is not simply a negativity or incapacity; it rather
concerns the basic constituent of human potentiality, namely that the human
can also not act; humans can also not contribute to or participate in the order
in which they find themselves.
This leads to yet another sense of potentiality-of-being than we have en-
countered so far. (a) For Ricoeur, this potentiality is presented in the very
world of the text since, for him, the world of the text proposes a possible
world which I could inhabit. Yet, the comprehensibility that is demanded
from this world, reflected in the concept of configuration, comes at a partic-
ular cost: the potentiality presented loses its dimension of contingency. This
is most clearly reflected in the sense of the event and its experience encoun-
tered in the story. For the reader, the narrated events are experienced as
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contributing to the fate of the character rather than to the contingency of
what happens. (b) Contingency, however, is crucial for the second sense of
potentiality, namely that of Heidegger. While Ricoeur refers to Heidegger’s
conception of potentiality-of-being, he is not able to retain this sense of con-
tingency. This Heideggerian form of contingency concerns in the first place
the imminence of the possible. By this emphasis, the notion of the event
retrieves a fundamentally different sense: it concerns an event to come and
can be experienced as the imminent and unexpected change of what is or of
what I am. This is another form of a potentialisation of what is. (c) Agamben
also emphasises the crucial role of contingency for a sense of potentiality to
which literary experiments strive. Yet, the sense of contingency he employs
is different from Heidegger’s. What Bartleby, the Scrivener presents is not
a phenomenon comparable to the imminence of death, the unexpected event
that may or may not come at this very moment. The figure of Bartleby does
not present contingency as the imminence of potentiality but rather as the
insistence and the resistance of potentiality over against the actuality of the
world in which Bartleby finds himself. In order to draw out the differences
with the other two accounts of potentiality in relation to contingency, let me
briefly explain what happens to the event in this story according to Agamben.
The story offers one crucial ingredient to understand the erratic behavior
of the enigmatic clerk. This ingredient is disclosed at the end of the story,
when the narrator informs the reader that Bartleby used to work at the Dead
Letter Office, which is an office in which letters that have not been delivered to
the intended addressees are collected. For Agamben, this Dead Letter Office
is nothing less than the reverse image of actuality: rather than (a) collecting
events that have taken place, as the story does to configure them in the unity
of a plot that discloses the fates of the characters to the readers, and rather
than (b) presenting an event that remains forever in abeyance, as the event
of death in Heidegger’s analysis, it (c) collects events that could have taken
place but did not take place. Melville’s depiction of the Dead Letter Office
and the experience it offers, results in the following striking images:
Dead letters! does it not sound like dead men? Conceive a man
by nature and misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness, can any
business seem more fitted to heighten it than that of continually
handling these dead letters and assorting them for the flames? For
by the cart-load they are annually burned. Sometimes from out
the folded paper the pale clerk takes a ring: – the finger it was
meant for, perhaps, moulders in the grave; a bank-note sent in
swiftest charity: – he whom it would relieve, nor eats nor hungers
any more; pardon for those who died despairing; hope for those
who died unhoping; good tidings for those who died stifled by
unrelieved calamities. On errands of life, these letters speed to
death.43
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As Agamben comments, ‘undelivered letters are the cipher of joyous events
that could have been, but never took place.’44 These letters do not narrate
events that happened, but are supplements to the events that did happen
and place the latter in light of what did not happen. This juxtaposing of
what is and what is not or of what happened and what did not happen is
the basic sense of potentiality: the potential is what can and can also not
be, what can but can also not happen. In this way, the dead letters collected
in the office do not affirm what is, but offer an experience of them in light
of their potentiality, that is, in light of what could have happened. Thus, it
offers an experience of events not as contributing to the necessary fate of the
characters, but rather it offers an experience of the fundamental contingency
of what has happened. This also means that these letters, as ciphers of what
could have happened, resist the closure of the story into a plot; they resist
the transformation of events that happen (or do not happen) into events that
must happen – either in the sense of the willful affirmation of the one to
whom it happened or the fateful affirmation of their being included in a plot.
In the story, Bartleby presents this resistance of a completed configuration
and closed account of actions, events, characters, and so on that mark a plot
in Ricoeur’s sense.
The sense of literature derived from this account of the letter, presented
at the end of Melville’s story, is that of a supplement to the actual world. The
experiments conducted by literature thus indeed concern this potentiality-of-
being, which is hidden in the sheer positivity or actuality of what is, of the
everyday world we inhabit. In this sense, the ontological commitments of
Agamben’s literary experiments are in close proximity to those of Ricoeur.
Yet, in another sense these experiments are different since they award a differ-
ent sense and meaning to exactly those stories that depict the main character
in their becoming-nothing.
In terms of his theory of literature, Ricoeur understands the breaking-
down of the character in light of the breaking-down of the narrative form
and, therefore, as something that belongs on the threshold or the limit of
literature as narrative. Yet, what he seems to neglect is that the characters
that are explored in these novels, such as the clerk Bartleby, do not only
present a particular form of self-understanding in which the pole of sameness
is removed and in which this is taken up retroactively by the understanding.
Instead, they also present a form of self-experience that is forwardly oriented
and that aims at being, living or acting in accordance with the sense of
potentiality that resists actuality. If we, in a Ricoeurian fashion, understand
the case of Bartleby as the paralysis of ‘the capacity for firm action,’ we might
miss the point that in Bartleby, we do not simply encounter an incapacity to
act, that is, a mere ‘I cannot act’, but rather the potentiality not to act, ‘I
can also not act’.
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In fact, the transformation of the clerk Bartleby is not the transforma-
tion of someone who can act into someone who cannot act, but rather the
transformation of someone who cannot act – since his only actions are the
automated, repetitive non-acts of which the work of a clerk consists – into
someone who detaches himself from this automated, machine-like behavior
by starting to use his capacity to not-act. In this sense, the self, stripped
bare in this way, is not simply concerned with the ‘nakedness of the ques-
tion’ concerning who I am, but rather concerns a mode of existence or a
form of life, not unlike the one at stake in Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s
Seinkönnen, in which Bartleby maintains himself in order to experience the
potentiality-of-being. Here, indeed, the commitment of literary experiments
is to offer an experience of being and acting differently, in which being is ex-
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